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The Commonwealth’s economy appears to have bot-tomed out and may already have started to expand.The Massachusetts Leading Economic Index for
February forecasts that real gross state product will grow at
an annualized rate of 1.8 percent through August. This is
the fourth consecutive positive reading. Furthermore, the
current economic index has remained steady for three
months in a row.
Now that the economy appears ready to begin a recov-
ery phase, we can assess this last cycle to understand how
the peak and subsequent recession unfolded in the state
and nationally, who and what sectors were affected, and
how this informs us as to the short- and long-term pros-
pects for the future.
Perhaps the most significant aspect of this recession has
been its brevity. It was not until after the terrorist attacks
last September that economy-watchers were in near-unani-
mous agreement that a recession had begun. The NBER
(National Bureau of Economic Research), for example, did
not officially announce that the country was in recession
until November. A mere four months later, the consensus
among economists is that the national economy is growing,
and moreover—at least while inventories are restocked—
that it is growing robustly.
A L A N  C L A Y T O N - M A T T H E W S
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The Current and Leading
Economic Indices for
Massachusetts
Sources: The Conference Board; University of Massachusetts; Federal Reserve Bank of Boston









































































The Massachusetts Current Eco-nomic Index for February was
127.7, up 0.4 percent from January (at
annual rates) and down 1.4 percent from
February of last year. The current index
is normalized to 100 in July 1987 and is
calibrated to grow at the same rate as
the Massachusetts real gross state prod-
uct over the 1978–1997 period.
The Massachusetts Leading Eco-
nomic Index for February was 1.8 per-
cent, and the three-month average for
December through February was 1.6
percent. The leading index is a forecast
of the growth in the current index over
the next six months, expressed at an an-
nual rate. Thus, it indicates that the
economy is expected to grow at an an-
nual rate of 1.8 percent over the next six
months (through August). Because of
monthly fluctuations in the data on which
the index is based, the three-month aver-
age of 1.6 percent may be a more reliable
indicator of near-term growth.
It appears that the state economy is
beginning to turn around. The leading
index has been positive for four months,
and the current index registered its first
positive growth in over a year. For the
first time in 13 months, state payroll
employment did not decline. The un-
employment rate has remained steady for
several months. These signals are con-
sistent with other indicators, including
rising shipments and orders in the
(national) computers and electronics in-
dustry, positive reports from industry as-
sociations and companies producing
semiconductors and related equipment,
a mildly upbeat view from the Federal
Reserve Bank of Boston’s latest Beige
Book report, and a nascent turnaround
in Massachusetts merchandise exports.
However, the rate of expansion pre-
dicted by the leading index for this spring
and summer is slow. For growth to pick
up beyond this tepid pace, businesses will
have to resume capital spending on tech-
nology products.
Submitted March 25, 2002






























































































Recessions in Massachusetts Are Historically
Worse Than the Nation’s
In the long run, the state’s population and labor force grow at
a substantially slower pace than those of the nation. In expan-
sions, however, the state’s employment grows at nearly the
same rate; in recessions, it declines more quickly. Furthermore,
recessions tend to be longer in Massachusetts, as well as deeper.1
This cycle we are now emerging from fits this pattern.
In the last expansion, employment grew at an annual
rate of 2.1 percent in Massachusetts versus 2.0 percent na-
tionally. In the recession to date (with employment data
through January), employment declined at an annual rate
of 1.8 percent in Massachusetts versus 1.3 percent in the
United States.2
The recession also appears to have begun earlier in Mas-
sachusetts. The starting date of the U.S. downturn was set
by the NBER to be March 2001, which coincided with
peak U.S. payroll employment. Massachusetts payroll em-
ployment peaked in January 2001, and the Massachusetts
Current Economic Index peaked the month before.
Estimates of output growth also indicate a longer and
deeper recession in the state. In the fourth quarter of 2001,
U.S. real gross domestic product (GDP) expanded at a 1.4
percent annual rate. The estimated Massachusetts real gross
state product (GSP) reflects a decline at a 1.5 percent an-
nual rate. Furthermore, U.S. GDP only declined in the third
quarter of 2001, while Massachusetts GSP is estimated to
have declined in all four quarters of that year.3
Business confidence also appears to be lower in Massa-
chusetts than in the nation, according to the Associated
Industries of Massachusetts (AIM) Business Confidence In-
dex versus the National Association of Purchasing Manag-
ers (NAPM) Index. The statewide AIM index in February
stood at 46.4, while the NAPM index for the United States
stood at 54.7. For both of these indices, 50 is the dividing
line between expansion (above 50) and contraction (below
50). Though the two indices are not strictly comparable,
because the NAPM index is for manufacturing while the
AIM index includes some nonmanufacturers, the AIM
manufacturing subindex, at 45.5, also stood below 50.
The Bubble Economy
One way to characterize the last phase of the expansion and
the recession is that it was a speculative bubble that burst.
Greenspan’s term “irrational exuberance” describes well the
psychology that drove a self-reinforcing boom in key sec-
tors of the economy, especially information technology and
stock markets. In hindsight, the predictions of endless
double-digit growth in the output of IT-related products
and services were totally unrealistic.
Even during the boom, many economists knew that
the economy was in the midst of a speculative bubble. It is
the very nature of a speculative bubble, however, that one
cannot predict how large it will get or when it will burst.
Furthermore, assuming the bubble will burst tomorrow—
and therefore not investing in the stock market or increas-
ing production to maintain market share—is not an opti-
mal strategy. “You can’t win if you don’t play the game”
applies in bubble situations.
It may turn out that the recession was short because
the dislocations that resulted from the bubble were not too
severe. Excess inventories, for example, were composed of
items with a short shelf life (e.g., electronic components)
rather than a long shelf life (e.g., real estate). Low inflation
made aggressive monetary policy feasible. Worker compen-
sation was more flexible downward than in past recessions,
which allowed firms to make more rapid cost adjustments
with fewer layoffs. The information revolution itself prob-
ably played a role by enabling decision-makers to receive
and act on signs of maladjustments more quickly. Ironi-
cally, the information technology feeding the bubble men-
tality may have also helped prick the bubble sooner,
making the required adjustments smaller in magnitude.
One is tempted to conclude that perhaps the bubble was
not a bad thing. It simply suggests that, for a period of time,
the economy overproduced and over-consumed. In the
recessionary adjustment period, it made up the difference by
lower production and consumption. Now the economy is back
on track and ready to resume “normal” levels.
Unfortunately, it is not that benign. The bubble re-
sulted, as one always does, in what economists call a misal-
location of resources, commonly known as a waste. Some
equipment in inventories was simply useless, because it was
customized for a deal that no longer exists. Telecommuni-
cations equipment put in the ground will never be used;
investment schemes will never return money; personal ef-
forts, sacrifices, and training now have to be made anew;
homes purchased are too extravagant; and so on. The
economy indeed may now be growing again, but on a slower
path than the one that preceded the bubble.
Finally, a bubble produces both big winners and big los-
ers, a result that is generally thought to be socially undesirable.
Why Has Massachusetts Been So Hard Hit?
Though the recession was relatively short and mild, per-
haps 13 months in Massachusetts and 10 months in the
United States, it was worse here. Because the pattern has
repeated itself many times, it is reasonable to assume that
there is a fundamental cause. Is it because the region’s slow-
growing population, combined with its skilled and adap-
tive labor force, enables it to move to capacity quickly, over-
heat, and develop more severe imbalances that require a
longer period of readjustment? Whatever the case, the proxi-
mate reason for this cycle was its relative concentration in
those sectors—IT and finance—that were most directly in-
volved in the speculative bubble.
According to a Department of Commerce study, Bos-
ton has more IT-related jobs than any other metropolitan
area in the country. Massachusetts, with 7.6 percent of its
workforce in IT-related jobs, compared to 4.8 for the na-
tion, gives us the country’s third-highest concentration,
behind Colorado and New Hampshire.4
In the broad NAICS-defined computers and electronic
products industry, Massachusetts has an employment con-
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centration two and a half times that of the nation.5  Boston
has the largest mutual funds industry in the nation, and
Massachusetts is among the top states in terms of house-
hold wealth in the stock market. As the speculative bubble
took off in the late 1990s, Massachusetts received a dispro-
portionate share of the growth; when the bubble burst in
2000, the state shared disproportionately in the crash.
The upside and downside growth rates were phenom-
enal. Though the size of the sectors was small relative to the
entire economy, their movements were so large that they
were the figurative tail wagging the dog. The table above
lists several indicators that illustrate the magnitude of the
bubble. In each case, a profile of the indicator over time sug-
gests three dates that define the boom and bust phases: a
takeoff date, when the growth rate of the series accelerated
sharply; a peak date at the highest level for the series; and a
trough date (often the date of the most recent data available)
when the series reached its nadir.
The boom-and-bust growth rates go
from the takeoff date to the peak and from
the peak to the trough, expressed at annu-
alized rates for comparability.6  For example,
shipments of computers and electronics
equipment in the United States started
growing rapidly in August 1998, and ship-
ments peaked 28 months later in Decem-
ber 2000. During that time, the average
annual rate of growth in shipments was
12.6 percent, or nearly double the rate of
growth of overall manufacturing during its
takeoff phase. Subsequently, shipments
plummeted for the next ten months, until
October 2001, at a 35.1 percent annual-
ized rate of decline. (Since October, they
have again begun to grow rapidly, though
their current level is as low as it was at the
end of 1996, before the takeoff began.)
Other technology-related indicators exhibit a similar pat-
tern, peaking in the fall or winter of 2000 and dropping
sharply until very recently. U.S. investment in information
processing equipment and software grew at an annualized
rate of 17.1 percent during the boom phase and has de-
clined at an annualized rate of 16.8 percent in the bust phase.
North American semiconductor equipment shipments grew
at an annualized rate of 87.9 percent in the boom phase and
declined at a rate of 61.4 percent in the bust phase. World-
wide semiconductor billings expanded at a rate of 33.8 per-
cent in the boom phase, and de-
clined at a rate of 39.2 percent
in the bust phase.
The stock market, in keep-
ing with its characteristic of be-
ing a leading indicator, peaked
earlier and also reached its nadir
earlier. Between its takeoff in
mid-October 1999 and early
March 2000, the Bloomberg
stock index for Massachusetts
grew at an annualized rate of
over 180 percent and subse-
quently declined over 50 percent
to its nadir in early April 2001,
losing more than it gained in the
takeoff phase.
The relatively greater impact
of the bubble on Massachusetts
is illustrated not only in employ-
ment and product data but also in exports and income.
Massachusetts merchandise exports, being concentrated in
technology products, grew much faster than those of the
nation as a whole and also contracted much more quickly.
Wage rate growth in Massachusetts peaked at an annual-
ized rate of 11.6 percent in the fall of 1999, almost double




























Deviation of Total Wages and Salaries from
Trend, by Source










Bubble Boom-and-Bust Rates of Growth (Annualized)
Boom Bust Takeoff Peak Trough
MA Merchandise Exports 20.0% -30.6% Sep ’98 Nov ’00 Nov ’01
US Merchandise Exports 12.7 -13.2 Sep ’98 Oct ’00 Dec ’01(note)
MA Wage Rate Growth 11.6 -3.0 Dec ’96 Oct ’99 Feb ’02
US Wage Rate Growth 6.5 2.8 Nov ’98 May ’00 Feb ’02
MA Payroll Employment 2.7 -1.8 Jan ’00 Jan ’01 Jan ’02
US Payroll Employment 0.3 -1.3 Jan ’00 Mar ’01 Jan ’02
Note: The analysis presented here is more accurately portrayed by the level at this date rather than the
lower level of September, which reflects the disruptions associated with the terrorist attack.
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In the recession, wage growth abated across the coun-
try but especially in Massachusetts, where average per-
worker wages actually fell. Wages as defined here include
regular pay and lump-sum payments, essentially bonuses
and realized stock options. It is these lump-sum amounts,
received by a minority of high-paid workers, that have ac-
counted for the dramatic swings in labor compensation and
income. The figures for Massachusetts are based on with-
holding taxes and are consistent with official data released—
with a considerable lag—by the U.S. Bureau of Economic
Analysis. For example, in its release of annual per capita
income, Massachusetts ranked first in the nation from 1999
to 2000, with growth of 9.4 percent. This was more than a
full percentage point higher than the next states: California
(8.1 percent) and New Hampshire (7.7 percent).
The effect of the bubble is also evident in the demo-
graphics of unemployment. For several years, the overall
unemployment rate in Massachusetts has been below the
national rate, reflecting tighter labor markets here. This
relationship has held throughout the current recession. The
unemployment rate in February, for example, was 4.4 per-
cent in the state versus 5.5 percent nationally. This rela-
tionship has also held true across broad demographic
characteristics. Unemployment rates by age, gender, or
minority status group have been lower in Massachusetts
than in the nation. Unemployment rates for all populations
have risen in the recession and, following typical cyclical
patterns, those for youth and minorities have risen the most.
What is unique about the current recession, particu-
larly in Massachusetts, is how college-educated workers have
been impacted. Their unemployment rates have risen to
levels comparable to those of the nation. Massachusetts resi-
dents with some college education, but less than a bachelor’s
degree—typical for skilled manufacturing workers in tech-
nology industries—now have unemployment rates compa-
rable to those of residents with a high school education. In
January, the estimated unemployment rates for Massachu-
setts residents were 4.1 percent for those with a high school
education and 4.7 percent for those with some college but
no bachelor’s degree. For a bachelor’s degree or higher,
the estimated unemployment rate is 2.7 percent in Massa-
chusetts and 2.8 percent nationwide.
The Devastating Impact on State Tax Revenues
State tax revenues have been much more sensitive to the
bubble’s boom-and-bust cycle than overall employment or
gross state product. Revenue growth accelerated at the end
of the boom, growing at an annualized rate of 12.4 percent
from May 1999 to its peak in March 2001, and declining at
an annualized rate of 15.2 percent from its peak through
December 2001.7
The bulk of the declines have occurred in personal in-
come and corporate taxes, due to drops in realized capital
gains, bonuses, realized stock options, employment, with-
holding tax rates, and corporate profits. The falloff in rev-
enue since March 2001 far exceeds that associated with the
prior recession, which for Massachusetts was the worst in terms
of employment and output since the Great Depression.
The most dramatic impact of the bubble has been in
capital gains taxes. The Department of Revenue estimates
these tax collections to have been over a billion ($1,046
million) in fiscal year 2001. In fiscal year 1996, capital gains
tax collections were $389 million. For fiscal year 2002, end-
ing in June, DOR estimates they will fall by roughly $600
million, or 61 percent.
Bonuses have also followed the boom-and-bust pattern.
The bonus season consists of the fourth and first calendar
quarters (most bonuses are received in December and Janu-
ary). Bonuses (and other lump-sum payments, i.e., payments
not received on a regular basis) for the peak bonus season
of 2001 are estimated to have been $10.3 billion ($3.1 bil-













Jan ‘98 Jul ‘98 Jan ‘99 Jan ‘00 Jan ‘01 Jan ‘02Jul ‘99 Jul ‘00 Jul ‘01
Unemployment Rates for Those with
Some College Education
The data are not seasonally adjusted, but are smoothed.
Sources: Current Population Surveys; author’s calculations












Total State Taxes for Budget
The data are seasonally adjusted and smoothed.













































































































the first quarter of 2001).8  In contrast, bonuses in the 1998
season are estimated to have been $5.4 billion for the 2002
season. This season, they are estimated to be $4.7 billion, a
reduction of 55 percent from a year earlier. At a marginal
tax rate of 5.3 percent, this amounts to a loss of about $300
million in withholding tax revenues over the prior year.
Even with a Recovery,
Near-Term Growth Should Be Weak
Evidence is mounting that a turnaround has begun. Most
significantly, the employment report for February was very
good news. Nationally, employment rose, and the unem-
ployment rate dipped slightly. Both payroll employment and
the unemployment rate held steady in Massachusetts. This
is the first time since January 2001 that state payroll em-
ployment has not declined.
Nationally (no state-level data are available), output and
new orders of computers and electronic products have risen
robustly since September 2001. For the three months end-
ing in January, shipments in this industry rose at an annual
rate of 10.8 percent over the prior three months; orders
were up even more sharply, at an annual rate of 29.5 per-
cent. Semiconductor chipmakers are now projecting slow
growth in the first half of this year and solid growth in the
second half. Chip prices are rising.
At the state level, merchandise exports appear to have
bottomed out and started rising. Initial unemployment
claims have fallen steadily every month since October on a
seasonally adjusted basis, from 53,400 in October to 41,700
in February. Both the withholding and the sales tax bases
recorded small gains in February, which is a sign that the
economy is turning the corner.
The Massachusetts Leading Economic Index suggests
that growth will be slow through the spring and into the
summer. This seems likely for several reasons. The state’s
economy is not likely to be back in full gear until national
investment in technology-related goods picks up again, and
this investment demand is likely to lag the overall economy
somewhat. First, business profits must recover, and then
growth in capital expenditures will resume. Production in
manufacturing—particularly in the IT sector—is well be-
low peak levels. Further layoffs and cost cutting are pos-
sible even as output increases, though it appears that the
worst is over.
The state’s budget crisis will constrain state spending
and result in layoffs of state workers. The mortgage-refi-
nancing boom is over, as mortgage rates have begun to
rise. Finally, consumer spending is expected to grow more
slowly than in a typical recovery, because it never declined
significantly in the recession.
Though Massachusetts should begin the recovery in low
gear, relative to the nation, there is no reason that the normal
pattern will not reassert itself as the recovery gets under way.
From that point, growth should resume at a robust pace.
Submitted March 23, 2002
1 See Benchmarks, Summer ’99, Volume 2, Issue 3, pp. 8–9.
2 The dates of the last expansion are defined, for the United States, by the
NBER, and for Massachusetts, by payroll employment turning points. The
U.S. expansion began in March 1991 and ended in March 2001. The Mas-
sachusetts expansion began in December 1991 and ended in January 2001.
3 In the BLS/DET’s annual re-benchmarking, released on March 1, pay-
roll employment in the state was revised downward. This resulted in a
revision of CEI-based GSP growth from a small positive growth (less than
0.1 percent) in the first quarter of 2001 to a small negative growth (0.4
percent) in that quarter.
4 The data cited here are for 1998 and were prepared for NEEP by
Economy.com. Economy.com used the Department of Commerce’s defi-
nition of IT given in The Emerging Digital Economy, except that they were
limited to 3-digit SIC detail by data availability at the state and metropoli-
tan regional levels.
5 From the 1997 Census of Manufactures.
6 The choice of dates, especially the takeoff dates, is somewhat subjective.
Also, be careful when comparing a positive boom rate to its correspond-
ing negative bust rate, as these rates become high. For example, if a series
doubles in one year, and then returns to its original level in the second,
the growth rate is a positive 100 percent in the first year, but “only” a
negative 50 percent in the second.
7 These are calculated on seasonally adjusted and smoothed total “for
budget” state tax revenues.
8 A quarterly wage and salary series is derived from withholding tax rev-
enues adjusted for rate and base changes, and exemptions. Details avail-
able from author.
ALAN CLAYTON-MATTHEWS is an assistant professor and the director of quanti-
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Computers and Electronic Products,
United States
Source: U.S. Census Bureau
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